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On November 7, 2006, Ohio voters approved State Issue 2—the Ohio Fair 
Minimum Wage Amendment—an amendment to the Ohio Constitution altering the 
state’s minimum wage laws.1  The Fair Minimum Wage Amendment was intended 
to provide additional protections for, and rights to, Ohio workers.  The changes 
included an increase in the Ohio minimum wage to $6.85 per hour beginning 
January 1, 2007 together with guaranteed future increases.2  The Amendment also 
explicitly defined the term “employee,” identified the exclusive exemptions to be 
applied to this definition, and imposed new record-keeping requirements on Ohio 
employers.3  Finally, the Amendment set forth when an employee may file suit for a 
violation of the Amendment and what damages may be recovered.4 
Significantly, the Amendment was written to be self-executing, such that no 
action was required by the Ohio General Assembly to implement the protections 
provided by the Amendment.  This ensured that Ohio workers would receive the 
protections they voted for without relying on legislative action.  Nonetheless, 
legislative action, while not required, was permitted, so long as such action was only 
to “implement” the provisions of the Amendment or to “create additional remedies.”5  
The Fair Minimum Wage Amendment explicitly prohibits laws “restricting any 
provision” of the Amendment. 6  However, the Ohio General Assembly did exactly 
that. 
On January 2, 2007, outgoing Governor Bob Taft signed into law House Bill 
690, proposed by then-Representative Bill Seitz (now in the Ohio Senate).7  HB 690 
purported to implement the specific requirements of the Fair Minimum Wage 
                                                          
 
1
 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 34a. 
 
2
 Id.  Future increases are ensured by the Amendment’s mandate that “[o]n the thirtieth 
day of each September, beginning in 2007, this state minimum wage rate shall be increased 
effective the first day of the following January by the rate of inflation for the twelve month 
period prior to that September according to the consumer price index or its successor index for 
all urban wage earners and clerical workers for all items as calculated by the federal 
government rounded to the nearest five cents.”  Id.   
 
3
 Id.  The Amendment provides that “employee” and certain other terms are to have “the 
same meanings as under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act,” and that “[o]nly the 
exemptions set forth in this section shall apply.”  As to record keeping, the Amendment states 
that employers “shall maintain a record of the name, address, occupation, pay rate, hours 
worked for each day worked and each amount paid an employee for a period of not less than 
three years following the last date the employee was employed,” and “upon request,” that 
information “shall be provided without charge to an employee or person acting on behalf of an 
employee.”  Id.   
 
4
 For a more detailed discussion of the provisions of the Amendment, see text 
accompanying notes 78-99 infra. 
 
5
 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 34a.  
 
6
 Id.  The Amendment specifies that “[l]aws may be passed to implement its provisions 
and create additional remedies, increase the minimum wage rate and extend the coverage of 
the section, but in no manner restricting any provision of the section.”  This specification, and 
its apparent violation by the legislation enacted to “implement” the Amendment’s protections, 
are discussed further in the text accompanying notes 99-106 infra.  
 
7
 2006 Ohio Laws File 184 (Am Sub. H.B. 690), Ohio 2006 Session Law Service, 126th 
General Assembly (Thomson/West 2007). 
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Amendment by amending Ohio Revised Code §§ 4111.01-4111.10 and adding  
§ 4111.14.8  Embedded in those revisions of Ohio’s minimum wage laws, however, 
were a number of requirements not prescribed by the Amendment and which were 
arguably in conflict with the provisions authorized by Ohio voters.  Whether or not 
these restrictions on the rights of Ohio workers were intended, they pose both a 
threat to the fidelity of our system of government—in that the legislature has 
attempted to trump the supremacy of the state Constitution and the will of the 
voters—and a thorn in the side of attorneys who practice in this area.   
This Article first provides a brief overview of federal and Ohio minimum wage 
law.  The Article then examines the text of the 2006 Amendment.  The third section 
delves into the provisions of HB 690 and the differences between HB 690 and the 
Amendment.  The final section explores litigation issues arising from these 
differences. 
I. FEDERAL AND STATE WAGE-AND-HOUR LAWS  
A. Historical Development of Wage-and-Hour Laws 
The concept of a “minimum wage” is not one that easily took root in the United 
States.  Massachusetts enacted the first minimum wage law in 1912,9 but the law 
covered only women and children and even then was not compulsory because the 
state’s minimum wage commission “could only recommend minimum-wage rates 
that would provide a living wage.”10  Within eight years, at least thirteen states had 
passed minimum wage laws,11 and in 1918 Congress enacted a law “providing for 
the fixing of minimum wages for women and children in the District of Columbia.”12  
However, in 1923, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the District of Columbia 
legislation as unconstitutional in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.13  In a decision later 
described as “a classic of laissez-faire philosophy,”14 the Supreme Court found that 
the statute “is simply and exclusively a price-fixing law” that “forbids two parties 
having lawful capacity—under penalties as to the employer—to freely contract with 
one another in respect of the price for which one shall render service to the other in a 
purely private employment.”15  The Great Depression began to change those 
feelings.   
                                                          
 
8
 Id. at § 1. 
 
9
 William P. Quigley, Full-Time Workers Should Not Be Poor: The Living Wage 
Movement, 70 MISS. L.J. 889, 905 (2001) [hereinafter Quigley, Full-Time Workers Should Not 
be Poor]. 
 
10
 William P. Quigley, “A Fair Day’s Pay For A Fair Day’s Work”: Time To Raise and 
Index the Minimum Wage, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 513, 516 (1996) [hereinafter “Quigley, A Fair 
Day’s Pay”]. 
 
11
 Id. 
 
12
 Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 539 (1923), discussed in note 15 infra.  
 
13
 Id. 
 
14
 Quigley, A Fair Day’s Pay, supra note 10, at 520 (quoting John W. Chambers, The Big 
Switch: Justice Roberts and the Minimum-Wage Cases, 10 LAB. HIST. 44, 47 (1969)). 
 
15
 Adkins, 261 U.S. at 554-55.  Justice Sutherland wrote that “[t]he feature of this statute, 
which perhaps more than any other, puts upon it the stamp of invalidity, is that it exacts from 
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The first attempt at establishing a national minimum wage came in 1933 when a 
$0.25 per hour standard was set as part of the National Industrial Recovery Act.16  
Once again, in the 1935 case of Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,17 the 
Supreme Court declared the act unconstitutional,18 and the minimum wage was 
abolished amidst concerns that employers could not afford to pay higher wages 
during the economic turmoil of the time.19  Finally, a nationwide minimum wage was 
established in 1938 with the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act.20 
B. The Fair Labor Standards Act 
The Fair Labor Standards Act21 (“FLSA”) requires employers engaged in 
interstate commerce to pay a minimum wage,22 as well as overtime pay,23 in 
                                                          
the employer an arbitrary payment,” the “declared basis” of which was “the extraneous 
circumstance that the employee needs to get a prescribed sum of money to insure her 
subsistence, health, and morals.”  Id. at 558. 
 
16
 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 703 (2009)).  
The Act authorized the President to promulgate a “Live Poultry Code” for that industry.  See 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 523 (1935).  The Code 
approved by President Roosevelt on April 13, 1934 established a minimum wage of fifty cents 
per hour, a maximum workweek of forty hours, and the right of employees to select a union 
and engage in collective bargaining.  Id. at 524.  The Act even required a minimum 
complement of employees in slaughterhouses, “the number being graduated according to the 
average volume of weekly sales.”  Id. 
 
17
 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 549-51. 
 
18
 The Court held that the Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the 
President “to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation 
and expansion of trade or industry.”  Id. at 537-38.  Specifically addressing the wage and hour 
provisions, the Court found that “persons employed in slaughtering and selling in local trade 
are not employed in interstate commerce” and “[t]heir wages and hours have no direct relation 
to interstate commerce.”  Id. at 548.  The Court’s view that regulating wages and hours 
exceeded the reach of the Commerce Power was summarized in its prophetic observation that  
[i]f the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions 
which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the federal 
authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people, and the authority 
of the State over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal 
government.   
Id. at 546. 
 
19
 Opposition to wage-and-hour legislation came from such divergent groups as national 
business lobbies and the American Federation of Labor, as well as from Southern Democrats 
who wanted “North-South wage differentials to prevent increases in agricultural labor costs 
and industrial prices.”  Quigley, A Fair Day’s Pay, supra note 10, at 528 (quoting JAMES M. 
BURNS, CONGRESS ON TRIAL: THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 77-
78 (1949)). 
 
20
 Pub. L. No. 75-718, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. ch. 8 (2009)). 
 
21
 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 
 
22
 29 U.S.C. § 206. 
 
23
 29 U.S.C. § 207. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss2/6
2010] INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 371 
 
specified circumstances.  The remedies for violations of the FLSA include 
compensatory damages, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees.24 
1.  Enforcement by the Department of Labor 
Congress empowered the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) to interpret and 
enforce the FLSA.25 The DOL is comprised of several divisions and seven major 
program agencies.26  The primary DOL office for FLSA enforcement is the Wage 
and Hour Division (“WHD”), which is part of the Employment Standards 
Administration (“ESA”).27  The WHD is responsible for enforcing the FLSA’s 
requirements on the minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping, youth 
employment, as well as various other workplace laws.28 
The DOL promulgates rules and publishes interpretations of the FLSA in 
Volume 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations.  These rules and interpretations are 
given different weight depending on the situations to which they apply, but are often 
given great weight by courts when construing provisions of the FLSA.29  The DOL 
also issues opinion letters in response to fact-specific inquiries regarding compliance 
with the Act.30  These opinion letters do not have the status of law with penalties for 
non-compliance, but they can have legal significance.  Under the Portal to Portal Act 
of 1947, a defense to a back wage claim may exist if the employer can show reliance 
                                                          
 
24
 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 
25
 Section 16(c) of the FLSA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to “bring an action in any 
court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of unpaid minimum wages or overtime 
compensation and an equal amount as liquidated damages.”  29 U.S.C. § 216(c).  Sums 
recovered by the DOL are “held in a special deposit account and . . . paid, on order of the 
Secretary of Labor, directly to the employee or employees affected.”  Id.   
 
26
 The seven major program agencies include the Employment Standards Administration 
(ESA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Employment and 
Training Administration (ETA), the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the 
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration (PWBA), the Veterans’ Employment and 
Training Service (VETS), and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  ELLEN C. KEARNS, THE 
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 41 (2007). 
 
27
 Section 4(a) of the FLSA established the Wage and Hour Division, to operate under the 
direction of an Administrator appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.  29 U.S.C. § 204(a).  
 
28
 The Wage and Hour Division also enforces laws relating to special employment, family 
and medical leave, migrant workers, lie detector tests, worker protections in certain temporary 
worker programs, and the prevailing wages for government service and construction contracts.   
 
29
 See Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Reich v. Newspapers of New England, 
Inc., 44 F.3d 1060 (1st Cir. 1995); see also Johnson City Med. Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 
973, 980-82 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing the difference between rules and regulations and the 
weight given to a particular rule or regulation under certain circumstances). 
 
30
 See Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-1, available at http://www.dol.gov/whd 
/opinion/AdminIntrprtnFLSA.htm. On March 24, 2010 the WHD issued its first-ever 
“Administrator Interpretation.” According to the WHD, “Requests for opinion letters 
generally will be responded to by providing references to statutes, regulations, interpretations 
and cases that are relevant to the specific request but without an analysis of the specific facts 
presented.”  This represents a change in longstanding WHD procedure.  
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on “any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation” 
of the Administrator of the WHD.31 
Enforcement of the FLSA is generally conducted by investigators located in 
various regional and district offices throughout the United States.  Enforcement 
actions typically begin with a complaint by an employee to the DOL, but the DOL 
routinely investigates potential FLSA violations without the filing of a complaint.  
Where violations are found, investigators typically recommend changes in 
employment practices to bring an employer into compliance and oversee the 
payment of back wages where liability is established. 
In the event an employer fails to comply voluntarily, the Solicitor of Labor 
(“SOL”) possesses broad power to conduct enforcement litigation in United States 
District Courts.32  Enforcement litigation typically takes the form of civil litigation to 
recover back wages, but the SOL also litigates before the DOL’s Office of 
Administrative Law Judges, independent commissions, and administrative appellate 
tribunals. 
2. Private Enforcement in Collective Actions 
The primary mechanism for private enforcement of the FLSA is the “collective 
action.”  Section 216(b) of the FLSA provides that “[a]n action to recover the 
liability” prescribed by the Act for unpaid minimum wages, overtime compensation, 
and liquidated damages “may be maintained against any employer . . . by any one or 
more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees 
similarly situated.”33  Section 216(b) specifies that “[n]o employee shall be a party 
plaintiff to any action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party 
and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.”34  Thus, 
unlike Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, class actions that typically include all 
class members who do not opt out, FLSA actions are “collective actions” in which 
similarly situated persons must “opt in” to the litigation.35 
Also unlike Rule 23 class actions, the commencement of an FLSA collective 
action does not toll the running of the statute of limitations for putative class 
members.  Rather, pursuant to the FLSA and the Portal-To-Portal Act, an opt-in 
plaintiff’s claim against the employer is not commenced until the date on which his 
or her written consent to join the collective action is filed with the district court.36 
                                                          
 
31
 29 U.S.C § 259. 
 
32
 The SOL conducts almost all government litigation under the FLSA as a result of a 
longstanding delegation of power by the U.S. Department of Justice to the SOL.  See Letter 
from Frank Murphy, Att’y Gen., to Elmer F. Andrews, Wage and Hour Administrator (Jan. 
13, 1939). 
 
33
 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   
 
34
 Id.   
 
35
 See Jackson v. Papa John’s USA, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-2791, 2009 WL 385580, at *4 
(N.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2009) (Gwin, J.) (“under the FLSA a putative plaintiff must affirmatively 
opt into the class”). 
 
36
 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) and 256; see also Cahill v. City of New Brunswick, 99 F. Supp. 2d 
464, 479 (D.N.J. 2000). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss2/6
2010] INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 373 
 
To “ensure[] that all potential plaintiffs receive timely notice of a pending suit,” 
district courts supervise the conduct of FLSA collective actions and the giving of 
notice to potential opt-ins.37  The process begins with “conditional certification,” 
which is a determination that the action may properly proceed under 29 U.S.C. § 
216(b) as an action “by any one or more employees” on behalf of “themselves and 
other employees similarly situated.”38  Courts in the Sixth Circuit “have used a two-
phase inquiry” to determine whether employees are “similarly situated for the 
purposes of the statute’s requirements.”39  The first phase—“the notice stage”—
“takes place at the beginning of discovery,” while “[t]he second occurs after all of 
the opt-in forms have been received and discovery has concluded.”40  At the “notice 
stage,” an FLSA plaintiff must show “only that ‘his position is similar, not identical, 
to the positions held by the putative class members.’”41 
As Judge Gwin explained in Jackson v. Papa John’s USA, Inc., a collective 
action under the FLSA “furthers several important policy goals.”42  These goals were 
identified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hoffman-LaRoche v. Sperling.43  The 
collective action mechanism protects workers’ interests by “allow[ing] . . . plaintiffs 
the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of 
resources.”44  A collective action also promotes judicial economy by enabling 
“efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising 
from the same alleged discriminatory activity.”45 
3. Compatibility with State Law Class Actions—The Opt-In vs. Opt-Out Debate 
A hotly debated issue in wage-and-hour enforcement is whether the opt-in design 
of FLSA collective actions can co-exist with the traditional class action mechanism 
under Federal Rule 23, which permits a court to adjudicate the claims of all members 
of a certified class who do not opt out, while the FLSA requires that every party-
plaintiff “give[] his consent in writing to become such a party.”  The question of 
conflict typically arises when factually related claims under state wage-and-hour 
laws are brought as class claims under Rule 23. 
                                                          
 
37
 Garner v. G.D. Searle, 802 F. Supp. 418, 422 (M.D. Ala. 1991). 
 
38
 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  
 
39
 Comer v. Wal-Mart Stores, 454 F.3d 544, 546 (6th Cir. 2006).   
 
40
 Comer, 454 F.3d at 546 (quoting Goldman v. RadioShack Corp., No. Civ.A. 2:03-CV-
0032, 2003 WL 21250571, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2003)).   
 
41
 Id. at 548 (quoting Pritchard v. Dent Wizard Int’l, 210 F.R.D. 591, 595 (S.D. Ohio 
2002)). 
 
42
 Jackson v. Papa John’s USA, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-2791, 2009 WL 385580, at *3 (N.D. 
Ohio Feb. 13, 2009).   
 
43
 Hoffman-LaRoche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989). 
 
44
 Id. at 170. 
 
45
 Id. 
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Prior to the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act, many courts found opt-
in and opt-out procedures to be “incompatible.”46  The typical rationale47 was 
articulated in Williams v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc.,48 in which the court held that 
granting class treatment of state law claims in an FLSA collective action would 
allow the plaintiffs to “circumvent the restrictive opt-in requirements of the 
FLSA.”49  Under this view, certifying both opt-in and opt-out classes “contravenes 
the purposes of the FLSA” because it “allows for the possibility that plaintiffs who 
have chosen to not opt into the FSLA class are nevertheless included in the broader 
Rule 23 state class.”50 
                                                          
 
46
 See, e.g., Williams v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-0605, 2007 WL 2429149, 
at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2007) (“incompatible”); Otto v. Pocono Health Sys., 457 F. Supp. 2d 
522, 523 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (“inherently incompatible”). 
 
47
 Another rationale for rejecting Rule 23 certification of state law claims in an FLSA 
collective action is the “potential confusion to class members that could be caused by 
employing conflicting class procedures in the same case.”  De la Cruz v. Gill Corn Farms, 
Inc., No. 03-CV-1133, 2005 WL 5419056, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2005).  The court in De 
La Cruz was concerned that: 
[P]otential class members, who are comprised of migrant farm workers, many of 
whom may not speak English and likely have very little understanding of our legal 
system, would be forced to make the confusing choices of opting into an FLSA 
overtime action and then deciding whether it should opt out of a New York overtime 
action. 
Id.  See also Thiebes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-802-KI, 1999 WL 1081357, at *4 (D. 
Or. Dec. 1, 1999) (among the “pragmatic reasons” for rejecting Rule 23 certification, the court 
found “it would be difficult to fashion an effective notice to prospective class members that 
explains their opportunity to opt in to the FLSA collective action as well as their choice to opt 
out of the class action”).  However, other courts have disagreed.  See Ladegaard v. HardRock 
Concrete Cutters, Inc., No. 00 C 5755, 2000 WL 1774091, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2000) 
(rejecting the argument that “it would be confusing for the class members to receive notice 
from the court about their choices to ‘opt-in’ to the FLSA action and ‘opt-out’ of the state 
actions under Rule 23(b)(3)”). 
 
48
 Williams, 2007 WL 2429149, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2007). 
 
49
 Id. at *4; accord, Otto v. Pocono Health Sys., 457 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524 (M.D. Pa. 2006) 
(permitting and opt-in action under the FLSA to be “accompanied by a Rule 23 opt-out state 
law class action claim would essentially nullify Congress’s intent in crafting Section 216(b) 
and eviscerate the purpose of Section 216(b)’s opt-in requirement”); Moeck v. Gray Supply 
Corp., No. 03-1950, 2006 WL 42368 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2006) (“[a]llowing [the plaintiff] ‘to 
circumvent the opt-in requirement . . . by calling upon state statutes similar to the FLSA 
would undermine Congress’s intent to limit these types of claims to collective actions’”) 
(citing McClain v. Leona’s Pizzeria, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 574, 577 (N.D. Ill. 2004)). 
 
50
 Williams, 2007 WL 2429149, at *3.  On the other hand, many courts did not see any 
inherent incompatibility between the FLSA’s collective action procedure and the certification 
of state law claims for class adjudication under Rule 23; see, e.g., Lindsay v. GEICO, 448 
F.3d 416, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that the FLSA opt in procedure does not preclude a 
district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claimants who did not 
affirmatively join the FLSA claim); McLaughlin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 304, 
308 (D. Mass. 2004) (“Nothing in the [FLSA] limits available remedies under state law”); In 
re Farmers Ins. Exch. Claims Reps. Overtime Pay Litigation, No. MDL 1439, 2003 WL 
23669376 (D. Or. 2003) (certifying Rule 23 class to assert state law wage and hour claims in 
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Courts that rejected class treatment of state law claims in FLSA actions often saw 
such claims as exceeding the scope of their supplemental jurisdiction.  Here again, 
Williams v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. illustrates this view: 
Should only a few plaintiffs opt into the FLSA class after the court were 
to certify a Rule 23 state law class, the court might be faced with the 
somewhat peculiar situation of a large number of plaintiffs in the state law 
class who have chosen not to prosecute their federal claims.  The court 
might then be in a position in which declining supplemental jurisdiction 
would be appropriate, given that the state law claims could be said 
substantially to predominate over the federal claims.51 
The jurisdictional plane tilted, however, with the passage of the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005 (hereinafter “CAFA”).  CAFA amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 
which confers diversity jurisdiction on federal district courts, by adding new § 
1332(d).  The new subsection provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or 
value of $5,000,000,52 exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action.”53 
While courts in FLSA actions formerly considered “declining supplemental 
jurisdiction” over state law claims when class treatment of such claims was sought, 
they now roundly entertain class claims in the exercise of their express diversity 
jurisdiction under CAFA.  For example, in Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,54 the 
court found it had “subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claim because the 
parties meet the requirements for diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action 
Fairness Act,” 55 and ruled that “Plaintiffs’ motion for class action certification under 
                                                          
conjunction with FLSA claims); Scott v. Aetna Servs. Inc., 210 F.R.D. 261, 268 (D. Conn. 
2002) (certifying Rule 23 class to assert state law wage and hour claims in conjunction with 
FLSA claims); Beltran-Benitez v. Sea Safari Ltd., 180 F. Supp. 2d 772, 774 (E.D.N.C. 2001) 
(denying defendant’s motion to dismiss state law claims because the FLSA does not prohibit 
Rule 23 opt-out class actions for related state law claims); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating 
Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)  (certifying Rule 23 class to assert state law wage 
and hour claims in conjunction with FLSA claims). 
 
51
 Williams, 2007 WL 2429149, at *3 (quoting Leuthold v. Desitnation America, Inc., 224 
F.R.D. 462, 469-70 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). 
 
52
 The jurisdictional amount is satisfied by any class action in which the matter in 
controversy exceeds five million dollars.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006).  CAFA “abrogates 
the rule against aggregating claims” and “confers federal diversity jurisdiction over class 
actions where the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million dollars.”  Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 571 (2005). 
 
53
 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).  A “class action” is a civil action filed under Federal Rule 23 or 
any “similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 
or more representative persons as a class action.”  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B).  Among 
CAFA’s “threshold” requirements, “the aggregate number of members of all proposed 
plaintiff classes [must be] 100 or more persons,” and the primary defendants must not be 
“States, State officials, or other governmental entities against whom the district court may be 
foreclosed from ordering relief.”  Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (citing and quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)). 
 
54
 Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 870, 879 (N.D. Iowa 2008). 
 
55
 Id. 
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Rule 23 should be granted as modified” on the state-law claim.56  Another case, 
DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc.,57 after finding that “[j]urisdiction for the 
state claims falls under the Court’s . . . original jurisdiction under the CAFA,”58 
concluded that “nothing in the FLSA precludes Plaintiffs from seeking [class] 
certification on their state law claims.”59  Post-CAFA decisions confront the 
jurisdictional question head-on.60  Hickton v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., Inc.,61 for 
example, squarely held that “[t]he inherent incompatibility doctrine . . . does not 
provide a basis for declining to exercise original jurisdiction when the jurisdictional 
allegations are sufficiently pled” under CAFA.62 
The DOL recently clarified its position on the compatibility of collective and 
class actions.63  In the Third Circuit case of Parker v. NutriSystem, Inc., Labor 
Secretary Hilda Solis submitted an amicus brief arguing that FLSA collective actions 
and Rule 23 class actions are compatible.64 
In Parker, plaintiff Adrian Parker brought a collective action under § 16(b) of the 
FLSA alleging that he and other current and former call center employees were 
entitled to overtime compensation for the weeks in which they had worked more 
than forty hours.65  Parker also asserted class claims under the Pennsylvania 
Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  
The district court granted Nutrisystem’s motion to dismiss the class claims under 
state law, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims on the 
basis of the inherent incompatiblility doctrine.66  
                                                          
 
56
 Id. at 909. 
 
57
 DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (E.D. Wis. 2008). 
 
58
 Id. at 1028 n.1. 
 
59
 Id. at 1033. 
60Jackson v. Alpharma Inc., No. 07-3250, 2008 WL 508664 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2008): 
Defendant has not described any basis on which the Court could dismiss state law claims 
predicated on CAFA jurisdiction.  Indeed, assuming that CAFA jurisdiction exists, it is 
unclear what would be accomplished by dismissal of the state claims, because Plaintiff could 
simply file a separate lawsuit in this district solely on the basis of the state claims.  Jackson, 
2008 WL 508664, at *5. 
 
 
61
 Hickton v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., Inc., No. 07-1687, 2008 WL 4279818 (W.D. Pa. 
Sept. 12, 2008). 
 
62
 Id. at *6 (citing Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 608 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 
63
 Compare Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, 
Long John Silver’s Restaurants, Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2008) (arguing that the 
written consent requirement of the FLSA is irreconcilable with the “opt-out” rules  for class 
certification Fed. R. Civ. R. 23), with Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Appellants, Parker v. NutriSystem, Inc., No. 09-3545-CV (3d Cir. Sept. 10, 2009) 
available at http://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefs/ parker%28A%29-01-21-10.pdf (arguing 
that FLSA collective actions and Rule 23 class actions are compatible). 
 
64
 Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Parker v. 
NutriSystem, Inc., No. 09-3545-CV(3d Cir. Sept. 10, 2009). 
 
65
 Id. at 3. 
 
66
 Id. at 4.  
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Urging reversal in the Third Circuit, the DOL argued that under the supplemental 
jurisdiction provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a federal court entertaining a claim 
under a federal law such as the FLSA “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all 
other claims that are so related . . . that they form part of the same case or 
controversy.”67  Section 1367, the DOL argued, “reflects a strong presumption by 
Congress in favor of having related federal and state claims proceed together in one 
federal court lawsuit.”68   
Pointing to the fact that § 18(a) of the FLSA contains a “savings clause” that 
provides that “states and localities may enact wage laws that are broader and more 
protective than the FLSA’s provisions,”69 the DOL argued that neither the text nor 
the legislative history of FLSA § 16(b) “supports the district court’s conclusion that 
the provision for an opt-in collective action under the [FLSA] is incompatible with a 
Rule 23 opt-out class action brought under analogous state wage laws.”70  The opt-in 
requirement of § 16(b) specifically applies only to FLSA minimum wage, overtime 
pay, and retaliation claims, and it makes no mention of state or other claims.71  The 
plain terms of the section, the DOL argued, show that the opt-in procedure “does not 
apply to state law claims.”72 
Moreover, the legislative history shows that Congress, in amending the statute in 
1947 through the Portal to Portal Act, intended only “to restrict FLSA actions, by 
requiring individual employees to opt-in, . . . not to prohibit Rule 23 state wage law 
class actions in federal courts.”73  The Portal to Portal Act specifically states that the 
opt-in requirement “shall be applicable only with respect to actions commenced 
under the FLSA.”74 
Finally, the DOL argued, the legislative history of the Portal to Portal Act 
contains “no suggestion of any intent to prevent class certification of, or the exercise 
of supplemental jurisdiction over, state wage claims.”75  The DOL pointed out that 
Rule 23 did not have an opt-out provision at the time of the passage of the Portal to 
Portal Act, and when it was added to Rule 23 in 1966, the advisory committee notes 
specifically state that the change was not intended to affect FLSA collective 
actions.76  Thus, in its amicus brief in Parker, the DOL has argued forcefully against 
the “inherent incompatibility doctrine.”  
                                                          
 
67
 Id. at 5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 1367(a) (2006)).   
 
68
 Id.  
 
69
 Id. at 7. 
 
70
 Id. at 8. 
 
71
 Id.  
 
72
 Id. at 9. 
 
73
 Id.  
 
74
 Id. at 10. 
 
75
 Id.  
 
76
 Id. at 11-12. 
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C. Ohio Wage-and-Hour Laws 
Since the passage of the FLSA, states have struggled with whether the federal 
law offered sufficient protections to local workers.  Ohio was, in some respects, at 
the forefront of this movement.  Ohio has provided minimum wage protections to 
employees since at least 1933 when the state legislature enacted the O’Neil-Pringle 
Minimum Wage Bill.77  O’Neil-Pringle allowed a state official to establish minimum 
wages for both women and children employed in certain businesses, including 
factory workers and other industrial occupations.78 
Ohio law provides wage-and-hour protections that parallel the provisions of the 
FLSA.  Minimum wage rates and remedies are prescribed by Ohio Revised Code § 
4111.02, § 4111.10 and, since the passage of the Fair Minimum Wage Amendment 
and HB 690, § 4111.14.  Overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty 
in a workweek is required by § 4111.03.  Employer record-keeping is required by § 
4111.08. 
II. THE FAIR MINIMUM WAGE AMENDMENT 
Like each of its predecessor wage-and-hour laws, Ohio’s Fair Minimum Wage 
Amendment was intended to provide greater protection for Ohio workers than that 
provided by the FLSA.  It was sponsored by pro-labor groups.  The intentions were, 
in part, realized.  In its first year, the new law resulted in doubling the complaints 
filed with the Ohio Department of Commerce.79  However, as this Article explores 
below, some of these steps forward are threatened by the restrictions put in place by 
HB 690.  First, we explain the protections accorded by the Minimum Fair Wage 
Amendment. 
A.  The Text of the Fair Minimum Wage Amendment 
As stated in the introduction to this Article, the Fair Minimum Wage Amendment 
includes several important changes to the Ohio minimum wage laws and new 
protections for Ohio workers.  These include:  (1) an increase in the state minimum 
wage with guaranteed future increases; (2) an expansive definition of the term 
“employee”; (3) limitations on the exemptions to coverage by the Amendment; (4) 
new record-keeping requirements for Ohio employers; (5) guarantees that the right 
of an employee to enforce the protections of the Amendment not be abridged; (6) a 
self-executing text; and (7) an explicit restriction on any legislative action that might 
impair the protections provided in the Amendment.80     
With respect to the new minimum wage, Section 34a provides that, with certain 
exceptions, every employer shall pay their employees a wage rate of not less than 
$6.85 per hour beginning January 1, 2007 and that this rate shall increase by the rate 
                                                          
 
77
 Enacted as the Ohio Minimum Wage Act, General Code §§ 154-45d to 154-45t (1938); 
see Strain v. Southerton, 74 N.E.2d 69, 70-71 (Ohio 1947).  Strain upheld the statute against 
the challenge that the legislature lacked authority to enact minimum wage legislation and the 
law affected “an unauthorized delegation of legislative power.”  Id. at 71. 
 
78
 See Strain, 74 N.E.2d at 71. 
 
79
 Policy Matters Ohio: New Legislation Undermines the Minimum Wage Amendment, 
http://www.policymattesohio.org/ohio_minimum_wage_undermined.htm (last visited May 19, 
2010). 
 
80
 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 34a. 
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of inflation on the 30th day of each September, beginning in 2007.81  Employees 
under the age of sixteen and employees of businesses with annual gross receipts less 
than a certain, annually-adjusted amount (initially, $250,000) may be paid at the 
lower, FLSA rate.82  Further, an employer may pay an employee as little as half of 
the state minimum wage if the employer is able to demonstrate that the employee 
receives tips that, when combined with the wages paid, are equal or greater to the 
minimum wage rate for all hours worked.83  These minimum wage provisions do not 
apply to employees of a family-owned and operated business if the employee is also 
a family member of an owner of the business.84  The provision also permits the state 
to issue licenses to employers authorizing payment of a lower wage rate to 
individuals with mental or physical disabilities that may otherwise adversely affect 
their opportunity for employment.85 
The second paragraph of Section 34a deals with the definitions of “employers” 
and “employees.”  Specifically, the Amendment provides that the terms “employer” 
and “employee” shall have the same meanings as those terms are defined by the 
FLSA with several exceptions.86  First, the term “employer” in Ohio shall also 
include the state and every political subdivision—a significant departure from 
federal law.87  Second, the term “employee” shall not include an individual 
employed in or about the property of an employer’s individual residence on a casual 
basis.88  And, third, only the exemptions set forth in Section 34a shall apply.89  This 
is particularly notable, as the federal FLSA contains many exemptions to coverage, 
which are not enumerated in Section 34a. 
Regarding record-keeping, Section 34a requires employers to “maintain a record 
of the name, address, occupation, pay rate, hours worked for each day worked and 
each amount paid an employee for a period of not less than three years following the 
last date the employee was employed.”90  The employer must also provide its contact 
information to all of its employees.91  An employee, groups of employees, or any 
interested party “may file a complaint with the state for a violation of any provision 
of this section,” which “shall be promptly investigated and resolved by the state.”92  
                                                          
 
81
 Id.   
 
82
 Id. 
 
83
 Id. 
 
84
 Id. 
 
85
 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
 
89
 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
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In addition, “[t]he state may on its own initiative investigate an employer’s 
compliance with this section.”93 
The means of enforcement are also explicitly addressed in the Amendment.  
Section 34a provides that “[a]n action for equitable and monetary relief may be 
brought against an employer by the attorney general and/or an employee or person 
acting on behalf of an employee or all similarly situated employees in any court of 
competent jurisdiction . . . for any violation of this section or any law or regulation 
implementing its provisions.”94  Such action must be brought “within three years of 
the violation or of when the violation ceased if it was of a continuing nature, or 
within one year after notification to the employee of final disposition by the state of 
a complaint for the same violation, whichever is later.”95  The Amendment further 
specifies that “there shall be no exhaustion requirement, no procedural, pleading or 
burden of proof requirements beyond those that apply generally to civil suits in order 
to maintain such action and no liability for costs or attorney’s fees on an employee 
except upon a finding that such action was frivolous in accordance with the same 
standards that apply generally in civil suits.”96   
If an employer has been found to have violated any provision of the section, the 
employer must pay all back wages, damages, costs, and attorney’s fees within thirty 
days.97  Payment shall not be stayed pending an appeal.98  “Damages shall be 
calculated as an additional two times the amount of the back wages and in the case 
of a violation of an anti-retaliation provision an amount set by the state or court 
sufficient to compensate the employee and deter future violations, but not less than 
one hundred fifty dollars for each day that the violation continued.”99 
Lastly and significantly, the Amendment specifies that the section “shall be 
liberally construed in favor of its purposes.  Laws may be passed to implement its 
provisions and create additional remedies, increase the minimum wage rate and 
extend the coverage of the section, but in no manner restricting any provision of the 
section.”100 
B. HB 690 and Its Departures from the Amendment 
House Bill 690 made changes to several provisions of Ohio law.  The bill 
amended §§ 4111.01-4111.10 and added § 4111.14.101  The Bill Summary states that 
Ohio’s prior minimum wage laws must be changed to “comply with” the new 
constitutional provisions: 
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 Id. 
 
94
 Id. 
 
95
 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
 
99
 Id. 
 
100
 Id. 
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 Id. 
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[B]ecause some provisions in Section 34a conflict with certain provisions 
in Chapter 4111 of the Revised Code, as explained in detail below, 
Section 34a supercedes [sic] those conflicting provisions (hereafter “prior 
minimum wage law”).  The bill amends those conflicting provisions to 
comply with Section 34a.102 
However, HB 690 did more than “implement” the Fair Minimum Wage 
Amendment.  As an authoritative treatise tactfully puts it, “some of the legislative 
language is different than the new language in the Ohio Constitution.”103  The 
provisions that conflict with the Fair Minimum Wage Amendment are examined 
below. 
1. Employees’ Right to Sue 
The first departure of the legislative action from the dictates of the Amendment 
concerns an employee’s right to initiate a suit against his employer.  HB 690 
provides: “No employee shall join as a party plaintiff in any civil action that is 
brought under division (K) of this section by . . . a person acting on behalf of all 
similarly situated employees unless that employee first gives written consent to 
become such a party.”104  This provision thus requires each and every plaintiff to opt 
into the action.  It is also arguably more restrictive than the Fair Minimum Wage 
Amendment, which permits any “employee or person acting on behalf of an 
employee or all similarly situated employees” to file suit.105 
2. The Definition of “Employee” 
HB 690 also defines the term “employee” in a more restrictive fashion than 
Section 34a:  “‘Employee’ means individuals employed in Ohio, but does not mean 
individuals who are excluded from the definition of ‘employee’ under 29 U.S.C. 
203(e) or individuals who are exempted from the minimum wage requirements in 29 
U.S.C. 213.”106  This new statutory dictate seems to even more clearly conflict with 
the Amendment.  The Amendment explicitly defined which exemptions were to 
apply—that is, only those enumerated in the Amendment itself.  The legislature 
purported to be confused by this, stating that perhaps the Amendment was poorly 
written and used the term “exemption” inadvertently.  The authors do not believe the 
Amendment to be unclear in any way.  The FLSA contains provisions for 
“exemptions” and “exceptions.”107  Those terms are consistently used throughout the 
federal minimum wage law.  The Ohio General Assembly’s attempt to import the 
                                                          
 
102
 HB 690, Bill Summary.   
 
103
 WAGE AND HOUR LAWS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 531 (Gregory K. McGillivary ed., 
Cum. Supp. 2007). 
 
104
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.14(K)(2) (emphasis added).   
 
105
 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 34a. 
 
106
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.14(B)(1).   
 
107
 Exemptions from the FLSA’s wage and hour requirements are provided in 29 U.S.C. § 
213.  In addition, some of the FLSA’s definitions have exceptions.  For example, the term 
“employee” does not include an individual “who volunteers to perform services for a public 
agency which is a State, a political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental 
agency” under certain specified circumstances.  29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A). 
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many exemptions from federal law into the new Ohio law is contrary to the express 
dictates of the Amendment. 
C. Remedies for Overtime Violations Unaffected by HB 690 
The Ohio Fair Minimum Wage Amendment made no change in Ohio’s overtime 
laws, but rather was limited to minimum wage issues.  That is also true of the 
implementing legislation, HB 690.  In particular, the “opt-in” mechanism for 
minimum wage claims under Ohio Revised Code § 4111.14(K) is expressly limited 
to civil actions “brought under division (K) of this section”—that is, to civil actions 
asserting minimum wage violations.108   
In Laichev v. JMB,109 Judge Michael Barrett of the Southern District of Ohio held 
that the opt-in mechanism of § 4111.14(K) does not apply to claims for overtime 
violations under §§ 4111.03 and 4111.10.110  Judge Barrett concluded that “since § 
4111.10 does not include a consent provision like § 4111.14(K)(2), Plaintiff may 
maintain a class action for violations of § 4111.10 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.”111   
Judge Barrett distinguished Judge Aldrich’s holding in Williams v. Le Chaperon 
Rouge,112 on the basis that, unlike the plaintiff in Laichev, the plaintiff in Williams 
had moved for class certification not only under §§ 4111.03 and 4111.10 but also 
under §§ 4111.01-99, which included § 4111.14(K)(2).113  Judge Aldrich later 
vacated her opinion in Williams in response to a reconsideration motion outlining 
many of the same grounds adopted by Judge Barrett in Laichev.114  Similarly, in 
Dillworth v. Case Farms Processing, Inc.,115 the court initially dismissed Ohio class 
claims, holding that “Ohio’s overtime statute allows only for an opt-in action similar 
to a collective action under [the] FLSA.”116  However, the court later reconsidered 
and vacated that holding.117 
The practical implications of changing the minimum wage laws but not the 
overtime laws in this respect is examined in the “practice pointers” section below. 
D. Consequences of the General Assembly’s Action 
It is fundamental to the functioning of our governmental systems that we respect 
the supremacy of the Constitution.  The same is true on both the federal and state 
levels.  Moreover, the Ohio Constitution provides that no legislative act may restrict 
                                                          
 
108
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.14(K)(2). 
 
109
 Laichev v. JMB, No. 1:07-CV-802 (S.D. Ohio Jun. 19, 2008). 
 
110
 Id. 
 
111
 Id. at 3-4. 
 
112
 Williams v. La Chaperone Rouge, 1:07-CV-829, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95510 (N.D. 
Ohio Dec. 17, 2007). 
 
113
 Laichev, No. 1:07-CV-802 at 3-4. 
 
114
 Williams v. La Chaperone Rouge, 2008 WL 2810619, at *1 (N.D. Ohio July 21, 2008). 
 
115
 Dillworth v. Case Farms Processing, Inc., No. 08-CV-1694 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2009) 
(Lioi, J.).   
 
116
 Id. Mem. Op. and Order, at 9. 
 
117
 Id. Mem. Op. filed Mar. 8, 2010. 
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any provision of the Constitution enacted by the voters: “The Ohio Constitution 
reserves for the people of the State of Ohio the power to adopt or reject, by vote at a 
general election, any law or section of law proposed by the General Assembly.”118  
The Fair Minimum Wage Amendment, itself, also provides that “laws may be passed 
to implement its provisions and create additional remedies . . . but in no manner 
restrict any provisions of the section.”119  
The authors recognize, of course, that “[i]t is difficult to prove that a statute is 
unconstitutional.  All statutes have a strong presumption of constitutionality.”120  
Before a court may declare a statute unconstitutional, “it must appear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly 
incompatible.”121  Even more challenging is “the fact that a statute might operate 
unconstitutionally under some plausible set of circumstances is insufficient to render 
it wholly invalid.”122   
The constitutionality of implementing legislation largely depends on whether the 
constitutional provision being implemented is “self-executing.”123  A provision is 
self-executing “when it is complete in itself,” and “specifically provides for carrying 
into immediate effect the enjoyment of the rights established therein without 
legislative action.”124  When a constitutional provision is found to be self-
implementing, any laws enacted to facilitate its operation must “not restrict or limit 
the provision or the powers therein reserved.”125  Thus, as the Colorado Supreme 
Court noted in a decision cited with approval in Ohio, an important objective of 
making a constitutional provision self-executing “is to put it beyond the power of the 
legislature to render it nugatory by passing restrictive laws,” inasmuch as “the power 
to impair would be the power to destroy.”126     
In Schryock v. Zanesville,127 the court explained the purpose of the language in 
Section 1g of Article II of the Ohio Constitution and of the referendum provisions 
generally in the following words: 
                                                          
 
118
 OHIO CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 1c. 
 
119
 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 34a. 
 
120
 Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 429 (2007).   
 
121
 Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 429 (citing State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 128 N.E.2d 59 
(1955) (Syllabus at ¶ 1)); see also Schaller v. Rogers, No. 08AP-591, 2008 WL 4078446, at 
*32 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 2008).   
 
122
 Harrold v. Collier, 836 N.E.2d 1165, 1171 (2005); see also Schaller, 2008 WL 
4078446, at *33 (quoting U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). 
 
123
 In re Protest Filed by Citizens for the Merit Selection of Judges, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 150, 
152 (1990); State v. Williams, 728 N.E.2d 342, 352 (2000). 
 
124
 In re Protest, 551 N.E.2d at 152 (citing Yenter v. Baker, P.2d 311 (1952)).  Conversely, 
a constitutional provision is not self-executing if it is “a mere framework,” In re Protest, 551 
N.E.2d at 152, and “so broad as to [represent] aspirational ideals that require enabling 
legislation to be practically applied.”  Williams, 728 N.E.2d at 352. 
 
125
 In re Protest, 551 N.E.2d at 152 (citing Daggett v. Hudson, 3 N.E. 538 (1885)). 
 
126
 Yenter v. Baker, 248 P.2d 311, 314 (1952) (quoting Kitchens v. City of Paragould, 88 
S.W.2d 843, 846 (1935)), cited with approval in In re Protest, 551 N.E.2d at 152. 
 
127
 Schryock v. Zanesville, 110 N.E. 937 (1915).  
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In this connection it will not escape notice that as to the state-wide 
exercise of the power the constitution goes into the minutest detail, 
leaving nothing to the action of the general assembly and concluding with 
the general statement that the provisions of the whole section should be 
self-executing, thereby putting it beyond the power of an unfriendly 
legislature to cripple or destroy it.128 
In In re Protest Filed with the Franklin City Board Of Elections by Citizens for 
the Merit Selection of Judges, Inc.,129 the Supreme Court considered whether Ohio 
Revised Code § 3519.10, which required that each person signing any initiative 
petition had to include his or her voting residence, conflicted with Section 1g.  The 
court held that “[w]e do not view this requirement as restricting or limiting the 
power to sign initiative petitions conferred by Section 1g, Article II, but as a fully 
contemplated and consistent requirement of the voting franchise provisions.  The 
purpose of this requirement is not to restrict the power of the people to vote or to 
sign petitions, but to ensure the integrity of and confidence in the process.”130   
Similarly in In re Protest of Brooks,131 the Court of Appeals of the Third District 
of Ohio considered whether the circulator compensation statement requirement 
within § 3519.05 violated the language in Section 1g on the ground that it restricts 
the exercise of the right of the referendum.  Recognizing that states have 
“considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of the initiative process,” 
the court stated that a reasonable reading of § 3519.05 reveals that neither the 
purpose nor effect of the circulator’s compensation statement is to restrict the rights 
of the people.132  It is to help ensure the integrity and reliability of the process 
through public disclosures.  Therefore, the law facilitated the exercise of the 
initiative power by the people.133   
In Schaller v. Rogers,134 the Supreme Court considered whether a ten-business-
day review could cripple a petitioner’s efforts at gathering the necessary signature to 
meet a 90-day deadline.135 The ten-business-day review effectively forced a 
petitioner to get the same amount of signature within an 80-day period. The court 
stated that, “[a]rguably, however, the ten-business-day provision would not always 
cripple such efforts.  The fact that the ten-business-day provision might work to 
restrict, rather than facilitate, the referendum process under some plausible set of 
circumstances is insufficient to render the trial court’s denial of relief an abuse of 
discretion.”136 
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 Id. at 939. 
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 In re Protest Filed with the Franklin Cty. Bd. Of Elections by Citizens for the Merit 
Selection of Judges, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 150  (1990). 
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 Id. at 154. 
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 In re Protest of Brooks, 801 N.E.2d 503 (2003). 
 
132
 Id. at 507. 
 
133
 See Schaller v. Rogers, No. 08AP-591, 2008 WL 4078446 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 2008).  
 
134
 Id. at *39. 
 
135
 Id. at *52. 
 
136
 Id. 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss2/6
2010] INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 385 
 
III. PRATICE POINTERS—IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OPT-IN VS. OPT-OUT DEBATE 
There are several points the authors would like their readers to take from this 
article.  First, § 4111.14 applies only to minimum wage claims.  Second, courts err in 
importing the opt-in requirement of Division (K)(2) [relating to minimum wage 
violations] to actions brought pursuant to the overtime law [Ohio Revised Code § 
4111.10].137  Next, it seems clear to us that, if the General Assembly contemplated 
that minimum wage and overtime claims could be asserted in the same action, it was 
not bothered by the idea of combining an opt-in action [minimum wage] with a 
traditional opt-out class action [overtime].  Thus, the courts’ struggles with this issue 
seem unwarranted.  Opt-in and opt-out claims may happily co-exist in a single suit.  
In addition, prior to the approval of the Ohio Fair Minimum Wage Amendment, state 
law actions brought on behalf of similarly situated employees were brought as Rule 
23 class actions.  The Amendment was not meant to take away existing procedural 
avenues to relief.  It is to be construed liberally to achieve its purposes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The protection of employees’ wage-and-hour rights has been hampered by 
various obstacles over the years.  Initially there was reluctance even to enact wage-
and-hour laws, and that was followed by a period in which fledgling attempts to 
establish protections on the state or federal level were struck down by the courts as 
unconstitutional.   Comprehensive federal protection was finally implemented in 
1938 with the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  Even then, private 
enforcement efforts were hobbled by the FLSA’s requirement that “[n]o employee 
shall be a party plaintiff to any action unless he gives his consent in writing to 
become such a party,”138 a requirement that limits private FLSA enforcement to 
“collective actions” that lack the breadth and concomitant effectiveness of traditional 
class actions under Rule 23.  The inherent limitations of federal enforcement 
mechanisms heighten the importance of state laws for the protection of employee 
wage-and-hour rights. 
This Article has shown what the Ohio Fair Minimum Wage Amendment was 
intended to accomplish, and how that intention has been frustrated by limitations and 
restrictions imposed by the legislature under the guise of “implementing” the 
Amendment.  Such limitations not only were not authorized by the Amendment but 
were expressly prohibited by it.  There is, therefore, ample basis for the courts to 
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strike down the restrictions and limitations of the implementing legislation and 
enable the Amendment to provide the strong protections that Ohio voters intended. 
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